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I. INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-first century dawned ominously for immigration 
law.  While many of the changes to U.S. immigration law we discuss 
in this article occurred just before the turn of the twenty-first 
century, it is our observation that the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
       †  Dinesh Shenoy is an associate attorney with Aronson & Associates, P.A. in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, with his practice focused in the field of immigration law 
with an emphasis on employment-based cases.  He is a regularly invited speaker of 
the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) both locally and 
nationally.  In 2003, he won the AILA Mentor Award for “Outstanding Efforts and 
Excellent Counsel to Immigration Attorneys By Providing Mentoring Assistance.” 
      ††  Salima Oines Khakoo is an associate attorney at Aronson & Associates, 
P.A. and a Contract Attorney with Civil Society, a non-profit organization that 
assists immigrant victims of crime, as well as the CEO of American Dream Law 
LLC, a solo firm focused on providing immigration services to low income 
individuals.  Ms. Khakoo is a graduate of Hamline University School of Law (cum 
laude 2002) and University of Minnesota’s Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs 
(1997).  She will be serving as Adjunct Faculty at William Mitchell College of Law 
as of January 2009. 
1
Shenoy and Khakoo: One Strike and You're Out! The Crumbling Distinction between the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
  
136 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.35:1 
 
attacks and America’s launch of the war on terror led directly to 
the current atmosphere of enforcement—first by the agencies 
responsible for administering U.S. immigration laws.  This has 
included renewed energy for the deportation of non-U.S. citizens 
convicted of a wide range of crimes, both violent and non-violent. 
There are numerous fascinating legal areas into which any 
discussion of immigration could tend to take us, including federal 
versus state power, labor law, income taxation and Social Security, 
refugee issues—not to mention policy discussions about whether 
and how to change our immigration laws1—and what, if anything, 
to do about illegal2 immigrants in the United States (a population 
most recently estimated at almost twelve million).3  Our aim in this 
article is more modest: we will focus on immigration consequences 
 1. The main body of immigration laws is the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, which has been amended numerous times and is commonly referred 
to by all immigration agencies and courts as the “INA.”  The INA appears in the 
U.S. Code at Title 8, Chapter 12.  Because the numbering of sections within the 
INA does not exactly correspond to those same sections’ numbering in Title 8 of 
the U.S. Code, this article will give the corresponding 8 U.S.C. section number for 
any INA section cited. 
 2. This article will use the term “illegal” to describe the legal status of those 
foreign citizens who do not currently have an approved, unexpired immigration 
status authorized by the Department of Homeland Security.  The supposedly less 
offensive term “undocumented” is simply not suitable to a professional level 
discussion of immigration law because it implies that it is the mere lack of a piece 
of paper that determines whether or not a foreign citizen has the right to be in the 
United States.  The term “undocumented” obscures the fact that ultimately 
immigration documents either are or are not issued based upon legal rights.  The 
terms “legal” and “illegal” place the proper emphasis on the fact that it is the law 
(with interpretation and application) that determines whether a foreign citizen 
has an unexpired right to be in the United States.  Furthermore, the term 
“undocumented” would only cover those foreign citizens who cross into the 
United States illegally from the very start (those who “enter without inspection,” 
commonly referred to as having “EWI’d,” usually across the southern border).  By 
contrast, the term “illegal” properly includes not only those who have EWI’d but 
also those many tens of thousands who were in fact initially admitted lawfully on a 
visa (such as a visitor’s visa) and then overstayed the permitted temporary period 
of time, or who though lawfully admitted on a visa then engaged in activity 
(usually employment) that is not permitted for their particular nonimmigrant visa 
category.  The term “illegal” also includes those foreign citizens who used fake 
documents (such as someone else’s valid passport) to enter the United States 
through a proper port of entry such as an international airport—such an 
individual was “documented” but committed an act of fraud that complicates the 
individual’s immigration case in the future in ways very different from someone 
who EWI’d. 
 3. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, TRENDS IN 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION:  UNDOCUMENTED INFLOW NOW TRAILS LEGAL INFLOW 
(2008), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/94.pdf. 
2
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of criminal convictions, with an eye to Minnesota-specific examples 
that illustrate the topics we address. 
We do not intend for this article to be a comprehensive 
practice guide for practicing immigration attorneys and criminal 
defense attorneys—even limited to the issue of immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions, the topic is much too broad 
for a single article to serve as a tool for daily practice.  There are 
several well-reputed practice guides4 available to the criminal 
defense and immigration bars, as well as one Minnesota-specific 
manual prepared by a highly reputed, then-local, immigration 
attorney for use by public defenders.5  Rather, our more modest 
goal in this article is to present the general legal community with a 
glimpse into the sometimes Kafkaesque world of immigration, and 
to provide judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law clerks 
alike with an appreciation for the immigration ramifications of 
criminal proceedings.  It is precisely because the immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions can be so harsh (with little 
room for discretionary relief by the time a deportation6 case is 
 4. See, e.g., DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORI ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
CRIMES (Nat’l Law. Guild); NORTON TOOBY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF IMMIGRANTS (4th 
ed. 2007). 
 5. MARIA BALDINI-POTERMIN, DEFENDING ALIENS IN MINNESOTA COURTS: A 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND CLIENT SCENARIOS (1999).  A 
version of this resource was published in Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory 
and Practice, 17 LAW & INEQ. 567 (1999).  To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
there has not been an opportunity for this manual to be updated since 1999, and 
thus certain conclusions it reaches must be modified in light of the past nine years 
of immigration case law.  It remains, however, an exceptionally useful and well-
written presentation with practical advice for real cases. 
 6. The term “deportation” is somewhat outdated.  The original Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 distinguished between “deportation” proceedings (for 
foreigners who had entered the United States, whether legally or not) and 
“exclusion” proceedings (for foreigners who had not made an entry to the United 
States, i.e., were apprehended while trying to enter the United States even if later 
physically paroled into the United States to await exclusion proceedings).  Compare 
INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251–52 (2006) (exclusion proceedings) with INA  
§ 242(b) (removal proceedings).  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996 merged these two separate kinds of 
proceedings into a single “removal” proceeding.  See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 304, 110 Stat. 3009–588 (1996) (creating present-day INA § 240 removal 
proceedings).  Despite this change from “deportation proceedings” to “removal 
proceedings,” the term “deportable” is maintained in the statute and continues to 
be used.  See, e.g., INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (“deportable aliens”).  Since 
“deportation” remains the word in general usage among the public outside the 
realm of Immigration Court, this article will use the terms “deportable” and 
“deportation” instead of “removable” and “removal.” 
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before an immigration judge) that immigration considerations 
must figure into criminal defense strategy. 
To frame the discussion properly, we will first briefly look at 
the all-critical distinction between citizens and aliens.7  We will then 
turn to the “collateral consequences” doctrine that is at the heart of 
the problem of deportation, resulting sometimes unintentionally as 
the result of certain criminal convictions.8  We will pause briefly to 
consider the recent instance of the complete dissolution of the 
civil–criminal divide in the case of criminal proceedings that from 
their very inception are designed to achieve deportation as the 
outcome.9  We will then turn to the immigration laws’ very broad 
definition of “conviction” that goes well beyond what most states’ 
law would consider a conviction.10  This will lead us to consider 
strategies both pre- and post-criminal court process that may arise 
in the cases of immigrants facing criminal charges or who already 
have criminal “convictions” for immigration purposes.11  Where 
appropriate, we will use Minnesota-specific examples to illustrate 
how immigration laws apply. 
II. CITIZENS VS. ALIENS—WHO IS AT RISK OF DEPORTATION? 
It is the authors’ experience that in everyday speech, the 
concepts of “citizen” and “alien” often are blurred.  It is common 
for native-born American citizens to think that when foreigners 
“get legal” they have become actual U.S. citizens.  However, in truth 
it is very uncommon for foreign citizens to go from having no U.S. 
immigration status directly into U.S. citizenship.12  For most 
foreigners, “getting legal” refers to becoming a Lawful Permanent 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. See infra Parts VI–VII. 
 12. One narrow exception is the provision for children who are born outside 
the United States to a U.S. citizen parent (but do not automatically acquire U.S. 
citizenship at birth) and who continue to reside abroad.  INA § 322, 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1433 (2006).  This provision allows certain such children under the age of 
eighteen to enter the United States as a temporary visitor, at which time a brief 
interview is conducted and U.S. citizenship conferred, so that the child goes 
directly into U.S. citizenship status without ever having first become a Lawful 
Permanent Resident.  See id.  This provision for children residing abroad is the 
counterpart of a provision that applies to children of U.S. citizens where the family 
resides in the United States.  Compare INA § 322, 8 U.S.C. § 1433 with INA § 320, 8 
U.S.C. § 1431 (2008).  See also 3A C.J.S. Aliens § 1824 (2008). 
4
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Resident (LPR).  LPR status is the right to reside permanently and 
work in the United States without restriction.13
Achieving LPR status is usually the end result of a tortuous 
(and torturous) process, often through more than one federal 
agency.14  Approval of Permanent Residence is genuine cause for 
 13. More accurately, “the term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ 
means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing 
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the 
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”  INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1101(a)(20).  Permanent Resident status may be “abandoned” by voluntary 
relinquishment or involuntarily through either spending too much time outside 
the United States or taking other actions inconsistent with residing permanently in 
the United States, such as taking full-time employment abroad, purchasing a 
primary home abroad, and/or claiming nonresident status to reduce U.S. income 
tax liability.  See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Abandonment of Lawful 
Permanent-Resident Status, 193 A.L.R. FED. 673 (2004).  For a comprehensive 
discussion of how to avoid abandonment of Permanent Residence, including a 
thorough scholarly discussion of the applicable federal and immigration case law, 
see Gary Endelman & Cyrus Mehta, Home is Where the Card Is: How to Preserve Lawful 
Permanent Resident Status in a Global Economy, 13 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 849 
(2008).  For purposes of this article, it is only necessary to consider Permanent 
Residents who reside in the United States and who have not abandoned their 
status.  If a Permanent Resident is deported from the United States (usually 
because of a criminal conviction), the status of Permanent Resident is 
automatically rescinded.  See INA § 246(a), 8 U.S.C. S 1256(a) (2006). 
 14. The main federal agency charged with administration and enforcement 
of the immigration laws is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  See 
INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103.  DHS subdivides its immigration functions into three 
sub-agencies: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), primarily 
charged with approving immigration benefits such as I-485 applications to adjust 
to permanent resident status; Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which 
includes the Border Patrol and which inspects all foreign citizens arriving at 
international airports and land/sea ports of entry who seek lawful admission on 
either a temporary or permanent basis; and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) charged with apprehending and removing foreigners subject 
to deportation.  See Noël L. Griswold, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the 
Department of Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 207 
(2005).  Some immigration functions, however, are handled by the U.S. 
Department of State (DOS), which issues visas through U.S. Embassies and 
Consulates overseas and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), which has a role in 
cases concerning both temporary and permanent employment of foreign citizens 
in the United States.  Each of these agencies publishes regulations that appear in 
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as well as other various memoranda, 
cables, and letters that do not have the force of regulatory authority but 
nonetheless are highly relevant to the daily practice of immigration law. Unless 
needed to illustrate a specific point, this article will not provide the CFR cites that 
correspond to and clarify the procedures concerning particular INA provisions.  
For the issues raised in this article, the case law of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) and the federal courts is more often the authority that interprets 
the provisions of the INA as they apply to criminal convictions versus the agencies’ 
regulations. 
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celebration, yet it is still a far cry from being a U.S. citizen.  
Becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen is a separate process that in 
most cases requires first being a Permanent Resident for at least 
five years.15  Many Permanent Residents never become U.S. citizens, 
either by choice or because they are unable to meet the 
requirement to demonstrate an ability to read, write, and speak 
words in ordinary usage in English,16 or are unable to demonstrate 
“good moral character”17 for the applicable period of time. 
For law abiding Permanent Residents who do not incur any 
criminal convictions, being a Permanent Resident (but not a U.S. 
citizen) might not make much difference in their day-to-day life.  
Permanent Residents can work for any employer of their choice, be 
self-employed, or not be employed at all if they are financially 
supported.18  Permanent Residents may buy and sell property, and 
even hold political office so long as U.S. citizenship is not a 
requirement for such positions.19  The main right that U.S. citizens 
have, which Permanent Residents do not have, is the right to vote.20
The distinction between being a LPR versus a U.S. citizen, 
however, comes into stark relief when criminal convictions arise.  It 
comes as a shock to some Permanent Residents that they are still 
subject to deportation from the United States for a wide variety of 
crimes.  The distinction between having Permanent Resident status 
versus having one of the lesser immigration statuses21 is not 
 15. See INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427.  For certain spouses of U.S. citizens, the 
required period of Permanent Residence is reduced to three years or shorter.  Cf. 
INA § 319(a), (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a), (b). 
 16. INA § 312(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1). 
 17. See INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (requirements for naturalization to 
U.S. citizenship, including “good moral character”) and INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C.      
§ 1101(f) (defining certain categorical cases where good moral character is 
lacking). 
 18. 3 C.J.S. Aliens § 48 (2008). 
 19. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953). 
 20. If a Permanent Resident votes in any federal, state, or local election and 
such voting violates a federal, state, or local law restricting voting to U.S. citizens 
only, the Permanent Resident becomes deportable with virtually no chance of 
relief from deportation.  See INA § 237(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6).  For a 
comprehensive discussion of state and local laws permitting or prohibiting voting 
by non-U.S. citizens, including policy arguments in favor of allowing Permanent 
Residents to vote, see Elise Brozovich, Prospects for Democratic Change:  Noncitizen 
Suffrage in America, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 403 (2002). 
 21. Lower down in the hierarchy of immigration status are “nonimmigrants,” 
who are foreign citizens admitted to the United States on a visa that limits them to 
a specific activity for a specific, definite period of time.  Common examples are 
foreign citizens who enter the United States on a B-1/B-2 visitor’s visa with 
6
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controlling on the issue of deportability for criminal activity—
having secured Permanent Resident status does not provide 
immunity from deportation when it comes to criminal activity. 
Rather, the key distinction is between citizens and aliens.  In 
short, an alien is any person who is not a citizen of the United 
States.22  Aliens may be deported, while citizens may not.  It is as 
simple as that.  When it comes to deportation for criminal activity, 
being a Permanent Resident versus having one of the lesser alien 
statuses23 offers little additional relief.24  Very little discretionary 
relief is available for Immigration Judges to consider applying to 
Permanent Residents who face deportation for certain criminal 
convictions.  For certain criminal convictions, the determination of 
whether or not an alien will be deported is more categorical—
either the outcome of criminal proceedings will result in no 
permission to stay up to six months (without work authorization); F-1 students 
attending a college or university to earn a Bachelor or higher degree; and H-1B 
temporary workers in “specialty occupations.”  See generally INA § 101(a)(15), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).  Many nonimmigrants aspire to become Permanent 
Residents through employer sponsorship, though not all are successful.  Other 
legal immigration statuses that are less than full Permanent Residence include 
refugee/asylee status (which allows applying for Permanent Residence after a one-
year waiting period) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for individuals from 
certain countries designated in the Federal Register on a sporadic basis.  See INA 
§§ 207–08, 244, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157–58, 1254a. 
 22. More accurately, “the term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen or 
national of the United States.”  INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (emphasis 
added).  The term “national of the United States” in turn is defined as either an 
actual U.S. citizen or “a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, 
owes permanent allegiance to the United States.”  INA § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1101(a)(22).  This narrow category applies mainly to individuals born in certain 
outlying possessions of the United States.  See INA § 308, 8 U.S.C. § 1408.  For 
purposes of this article, the distinction between “citizen” and “national” is 
unimportant, since nationals are not “aliens” and thus not subject to deportation. 
 23. See supra note 21.  For other non-criminal grounds of deportability, the 
distinction between being a Permanent Resident versus a temporary 
nonimmigrant or an illegal alien is more significant.  For example, the grounds of 
deportation for having entered illegally, INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(1)(B), or for having entered legally but later fallen out of temporary 
nonimmigrant status, INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C), do not apply 
to a Permanent Resident. 
 24. See e.g., INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (requiring mandatory detention 
of aliens deportable for criminal convictions, regardless of whether or not the 
alien is a long-time Permanent Resident).  See also, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 
(2003) (rejecting constitutional challenge by Permanent Resident to mandatory 
detention under INA § 236(c) and noting “[i]n sum, the detention at stake under 
[INA § 236(c)] lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in 
which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the 
alien chooses to appeal.”). 
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deportability or will result in near-certain deportability because the 
forms of relief available in Immigration Court are virtually 
eliminated.25
Many immigration attorneys have witnessed the spectacle of 
aliens who became Permanent Residents at a young age (through 
family-based immigration, or whose family was granted refugee or 
asylee status and became Permanent Residents later, or who came 
through adoption)26 only to be deported to the country they left as 
infants or as young children.  While it is not the authors’ intention 
to downplay the seriousness of crimes committed by aliens who are 
subject to deportation, such cases involving lifelong Permanent 
Residents who did not become automatic U.S. citizens are 
especially tragic.  Many such Permanent Residents were not aware 
that they were not U.S. citizens and have grown up culturally as 
Americans, with little or no knowledge of the country from which 
they were adopted.  Yet, under deportability grounds for criminal 
convictions, their long period of residence often does not factor 
 25. See infra note 36 (listing commonly sought forms of relief from 
deportation).  Attention concerning the issue of deportability for criminal 
convictions tends to focus on aliens who are Permanent Residents, because aliens 
who have fallen out of status or who have never had any valid immigration status 
in the first place are much more easily deported under the grounds related to 
expiration of or lack of status.  See supra note 23.  Even for illegal aliens, however, 
who if apprehended by DHS would be deportable under those easier grounds, 
avoiding deportability for a criminal conviction through careful planning at the 
criminal court stage is vital and should not be neglected.  This is because such an 
illegal alien’s future ability to get Permanent Resident status will require proving 
that the alien is “not inadmissible” to Permanent Resident status.  While the 
grounds of inadmissibility for criminal activity do not exactly match the grounds of 
deportability for criminal convictions (the grounds of inadmissibility are broader, 
see Section VI below), the two are similar and a proper analysis of immigration 
consequences of crime should also take inadmissibility into account.  Where 
necessary below, this article discusses inadmissibility as well. 
 26. Following enactment of the Child Citizenship Act (CCA) of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-395 (2000) (codified at INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431), orphans adopted by 
U.S. citizens who acquire Permanent Residence through an established procedure 
assisted by USCIS automatically become U.S. citizens as well.  This avoids the 
problem of such children (and their U.S. citizen adoptive parents) thinking they 
are U.S. citizens, only to discover as adults that they are still only Permanent 
Residents and have unwittingly rendered themselves deportable by claiming to be 
U.S. citizens, either through applying for a U.S. passport or through voting.  The 
CCA created exemptions from deportability for such unintentional claims to U.S. 
citizenship by an adopted Permanent Resident.  See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(6)(B), 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6)(B).  Yet, adopted children who turned eighteen prior to the 
effective date of the CCA and who did not become automatic U.S. citizens under 
the more restrictive pre-CCA law remain Permanent Residents; such aliens remain 
subject to deportation for certain criminal convictions. 
8
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into whether they may stay in the United States.27  Thus, the analysis 
of deportability must be an integral part of strategizing criminal 
defense at the outset of criminal proceedings.  By the time an alien 
with a criminal conviction comes to the attention of Homeland 
Security, it may well be too late to prevent deportation.28
III. THE CIVIL–CRIMINAL DIVIDE & THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE 
Avoiding deportation due to criminal activity is complicated by 
the fact that deportation proceedings are civil in nature, not 
criminal.29  The civil–criminal distinction is a longstanding one in 
American law; many of the constitutional protections in criminal 
proceedings have not extended to civil court proceedings.30  As the 
 27. See infra note 36 (explaining that Cancellation of Removal under INA  
§ 240A, 8 U.S.C. §1229b (a) is a discretionary form of relief that is categorically 
barred if the Permanent Resident has a conviction for an aggravated felony). 
 28. It is, of course, wise for criminal defense counsel to determine whether a 
client is in fact a U.S. citizen.  While not common, some defendants are pleasantly 
surprised to find out that they are in fact U.S. citizens without knowing it (as 
compared to the more tragic situation).  See supra note 26.  There are provisions 
for deriving U.S. citizenship automatically at birth even if not physically born in 
the United States.  See INA § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401.  Or there is the possibility for 
some Permanent Residents to acquire U.S. citizenship automatically before the 
age of eighteen, even if they are not aware of it.  See supra note 26 and 
accompanying text.  Because automatic acquisition of citizenship most often 
hinges on the citizenship laws in effect at either the time of birth or time the 
relevant triggering events occurred, and since U.S. citizenship laws have been 
amended numerous times in the second half of the twentieth century, interested 
practitioners are recommended to consult Daniel Levy’s comprehensive treatise 
that compiles and analyzes past and current U.S. citizenship law.  Daniel Levy, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK (2007 ed.).  There is no better way to 
win a deportation case than to prove that your client is a U.S. citizen and thus not 
deportable. 
 29. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation 
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this 
country, not to punish an unlawful entry.”).
 30. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (where a federal 
agency imposed monetary penalties and occupational debarment on bankers, 
then later criminally prosecuted the bankers for essentially the same conduct, 
held, that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not implicated 
because the federal administrative agency proceedings were civil, not criminal).  
Deportation proceedings are administrative agency proceedings conducted by the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a part of the Department of 
Justice.  See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2008).  The immigration judges who hear 
deportation cases are appointed by the Attorney General, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 
(2008); they are not Article III judges with lifetime tenure, and the quality of 
decision making varies greatly.  Recently the Department of Justice’s own internal 
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) published an extensive report on the 
9
Shenoy and Khakoo: One Strike and You're Out! The Crumbling Distinction between the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
  
144 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.35:1 
 
U.S. Supreme Court has famously stated, “it must be remembered 
that although deportation technically is not criminal punishment . . 
. deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life worth 
living.’”31
The effect of this civil–criminal distinction is particularly 
catastrophic in the case of immigrants facing deportation for 
criminal convictions.  Other civil sanctions such as debarment from 
the practice of law, or forfeiture of property, leave a U.S. citizen 
criminal defendant still able to earn some other livelihood in the 
United States.  But deportation means permanent exclusion from 
the United States with almost no hope of ever returning, except to 
visit briefly.32  Although deportation will be the near certain result 
from incurring any one of a broad range of criminal convictions, it 
is nonetheless deemed only a “collateral consequence” of the 
criminal process. 
The distinction between the direct consequences of a 
conviction or guilty plea and the collateral consequences is a 
allegations of politicized hiring for numerous positions within the Justice 
Department, including Immigration Judges, commonly abbreviated as “IJs.”  See 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AN 
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND 
OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008) www.usdoj.gov/opr/.  
The position of IJ is a civil service position for which considering applicants’ 
political and ideological affiliations is not permitted; however, for a period of 
several years, the Office of the Attorney General applied a political litmus test to 
the hiring of IJs.  In fact, the OPR concluded that “[t]he evidence showed that the 
most systematic use of political or ideological affiliations in screening candidates 
for career positions occurred in the selection of IJs [versus in other Justice 
Department hires].”  Id. at 137.  The OPR report’s conclusion concerning the 
hiring of Js stated that: 
[i]n sum, the evidence showed that [Office of Attorney 
General] employees [Kyle] Sampson, [Jan] Williams, and 
[Monica] Goodling violated federal law and [Justice] 
Department policy, and Sampson and Goodling committed 
misconduct, by considering political and ideological affiliations 
in soliciting and selecting IJs, which are career positions 
protected by the civil service laws. 
Id. 
 31. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945), (citing Ng Fung Ho v. White, 
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)). 
 32. Deportation from the United States for a criminal conviction will 
generally (though not absolutely always) leave aliens permanently “inadmissible” 
to the United States for the rest of their lives.  See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) 
(2006) (inadmissibility grounds).  There is the possibility of making temporary 
visits to the United States in the future if a waiver is granted, but this waiver is 
temporary and does not make it possible to apply for Permanent Residence in the 
future.  See INA § 212(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3). 
10
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legitimate one—to require criminal courts to advise a defendant of 
every possible collateral consequence under the sun could become 
absurd.  (E.g., “Your honor, when you accepted my plea of guilty to 
solicitation of a prostitute it was a manifest injustice because you 
did not advise me that my wife was likely to find out about it, and 
now she’s divorcing me.”).  If guilty pleas could be overturned 
because a defendant was not advised of every single remote 
possibility of pleading guilty, there would not be any finality to the 
criminal court process.33
Compared to lesser hardships such as the loss of a professional 
license or forfeiture of property, though, deportation is arguably 
not just a “collateral” consequence that might happen following 
certain criminal convictions.  Under present immigration laws, the 
fact that an alien defendant will or will not become deportable is 
near certain by the time criminal proceedings are concluded.34  
Where in the past there was the possibility of an immigration judge 
granting a discretionary waiver by taking into consideration factors 
such as the alien’s length of residence in the United States,35 at 
present the relief from deportation that is available has been 
almost entirely proscribed once the conviction passes a certain 
threshold.36
 33. Procedurally, many of the claims by aliens that they were not advised of 
the likelihood of deportation arise not at the trial court level itself but rather in 
the form of motions to vacate guilty pleas after criminal proceedings are complete.  
We will touch on the issue of vacating of pleas further below.  See infra Part VII. 
 34. See infra note 36. 
 35. See INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), repealed by Illegal Immigration 
Reform & Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRAIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-
208, INA § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3597 (1996).  After much litigation, the 
Supreme Court restored INA § 212(c) relief for aliens who had pled guilty prior to 
April 24, 1996.  See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 36. The three most commonly triggered grounds of deportation for criminal 
convictions are for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (“CIMTs”), see INA  
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), aggravated felonies, see INA  
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and controlled substance 
offenses, see INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  The “aggravated 
felony” ground is defined by a very broad list of offense categories defined at INA 
§ 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  The aggravated felony list is quite broad 
and includes attempts to commit any enumerated aggravated felony, leading to 
extreme results such as one recent case in which a Permanent Resident was 
deportable for being convicted of an aggravated felony for an attempt to commit a 
crime involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim(s) was more than 
$10,000, even if the loss did not actually occur.  See In re S-I-K, 24 I. & N. Dec. 324 
(2007).  The most commonly sought forms of relief from deportation in 
immigration court are (ignoring for the moment the distinction between 
Permanent Residents versus aliens with a lesser or no status and not including the 
11
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Thus, we would submit that the reality of deportation (unlike 
other “collateral consequences”) is that in almost black-and-white, 
up-or-down fashion, the outcome of the criminal court proceedings 
determines whether or not deportation will result.  Though this 
reality certainly is not the fault of the states, it is the present reality.  
We submit that deportation should be considered a direct 
consequence of criminal court proceedings that must be fully 
explored and discussed between the judge, prosecutor and defense 
attorney, and the alien defendant, before any plea is entered. 
Much as we might like to see this shift in the law take place, we 
must admit that this argument has not found traction in the courts.  
In this regard, it is worth examining what the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has held concerning deportation as a collateral consequence 
of pleading guilty to a crime.  In the Alanis case, defendant Roel 
Alanis was a longtime Permanent Resident who pled guilty to 
felony and misdemeanor offenses involving controlled substances 
and welfare fraud.37  The nature of the offenses and the maximum 
possible punishments38 made Alanis deportable.39  The court 
small category of family-based immigrants with the proper facts to “adjust status” 
to Permanent Resident to avoid being deported): asylum, INA § 208, 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1158, cancellation of removal, § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b), withholding of 
removal, § 241(b)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), withholding of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT), see Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G, § 2242(a) 
(1998); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–.18), and for some nationalities, Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS), see INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a).  Each of these forms of 
relief is either categorically or near effectively barred for aliens convicted of 
aggravated felony crimes.  See INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) 
(barring asylum), INA §§ 240A(a)(3) & (b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(3) & 
(b)(1)(C) (barring cancellation of removal), INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (barring withholding of removal in most cases).  About the 
only form of relief from deportation not barred by an aggravated felony conviction 
is withholding under the CAT.  See, e.g., In re J-F-F, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (2006) 
(alien with aggravated felony conviction permitted to request withholding of 
removal under CAT, though relief was denied due to a lack of evidence that it was 
more likely than not the alien would be tortured if returned to his home country). 
 37. Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1998). 
 38. Of the main deportation grounds for criminal convictions, one hinges 
upon the maximum possible punishment for the particular crime (regardless of the 
actual sentence imposed), see INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(a)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(a)(i)(II) (deportability for crimes involving moral turpitude “for 
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed”), while others hinge on 
the actual sentence imposed, see, e.g., INA §§ 101(a)(43)(G) and 
237(a)(2)(A)(a)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(a)(iii) 
(deportability for aggravated felony theft crime only if an actual sentence of one 
year or longer is imposed), as interpreted by the BIA in In re Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
173 (2001) (not deportable under INA §§ 101(a)(43)(G) and 
237(a)(2)(A)(a)(iii) where a criminal court vacated the one year prison sentence 
12
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agreed that Alanis indeed had not been warned of the possible 
immigration consequences.40  That lack of a warning, however, did 
not mean that Alanis’s plea was not intelligent, thus failing the 
third prong of the test that a manifest injustice has occurred when 
a guilty plea is made which is not accurate, voluntary, and 
intelligent.41  Since Alanis’s guilty plea was accurate, voluntary, and 
intelligent as to the direct consequences of his plea (i.e., the 
maximum prison sentence to be imposed and the amount of any 
fine), his lack of knowledge of the collateral consequence of 
deportation did not constitute a manifest injustice.42  As the court 
put it, 
[I]t makes sense that deportation is not a direct 
consequence of the guilty plea because deportation is 
neither definite, immediate, nor automatic.  Before a 
resident alien [i.e., a Permanent Resident] such as Alanis 
can be deported, the INS43 must exercise its discretion to 
commence deportation proceedings and, prior to 
deportation, there are various administrative procedures 
which must be followed.44
The reality, however, is that deportation is virtually definite, 
immediate, and automatic.  Contrary to the court’s assertion that 
the decision whether or not to initiate removal proceedings against 
a particular alien with a deportable criminal conviction is a pure 
discretionary decision by DHS that might well not result in 
deportation, the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly states: 
“[I]n the case of an alien who is convicted of an offense which [sic] 
makes the alien deportable, the Attorney General shall begin any 
removal proceeding as expeditiously as possible after the date of 
conviction.”45
of an alien convicted of a theft offense and revised the sentence to 360 days of 
imprisonment). 
 39. For the controlled substance offense convictions that Alanis pled guilty to, 
deportability under INA § 237(a)(2)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1127(a)(2)(C) was certain. 
 40. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 579. 
 43. The INS was dissolved on March 1, 2003 and its functions were 
transferred to DHS.  See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 
Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 44. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578–79. 
 45. INA § 239(d)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(1) (emphasis added).  For criminal 
court proceedings in federal court against an alien who is not a Permanent 
Resident, the INA allows for the deportation order for an aggravated felony crime 
to be entered as part of the very same criminal court proceeding, which further 
13
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The use of “shall” (as opposed to “may”) confirms that the 
deportation of aliens who are deportable for criminal convictions is 
given the highest priority.  And as noted earlier, once an alien 
defendant is convicted of any of the wide range of crimes that 
constitute an “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes, the 
chances of escaping deportation are next to none.46
Lest it seem that we are blaming the state courts for 
unwittingly luring alien defendants into getting deported without 
squarely confronting the issue, we will note that following the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Alanis, the Minnesota 
Rules of Criminal Procedure were updated to require that all 
defendants who intend to plead guilty first be advised that if the 
defendant is not a U.S. citizen, a plea of guilty may result in 
deportation.47  It must be noted, however, that these advisals are 
made as part of a long list of advisals at the beginning of a hearing 
at which a defendant generally already plans to plead guilty.  Based 
upon our own experience we are forced to question whether these 
advisals truly “sink in” and result in alien defendants factoring in 
the risk of deportation into their decision to plead guilty or not.  
For an advisal about possible deportation to be more effective, it 
should be required at the beginning of the criminal court process, 
no later than the charging stage, with repetition later in the 
proceedings before pleading guilty or proceeding to trial. 
IV. THE BLURRING OF THE CRIMINAL–CIVIL DISTINCTION: 
DEPORTATION AS AN INTENDED CONSEQUENCE 
Even if federal and state case law will for the foreseeable future 
continue to treat deportation as only a collateral consequence of a 
criminal conviction or other disposition, the reality is that the civil–
criminal distinction is being eroded steadily.  Or, to be more 
accurate, in some recent instances the pretense of deportation 
being a collateral consequence is maintained while the reality is 
that criminal proceedings are undertaken with the desired 
erodes the claim that deportation is not a direct consequence of the criminal 
conviction.  See INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228. 
 46. See supra note 36.  Even if a criminal conviction happens to not belong to 
the aggravated felony list, deportable convictions for crimes involving moral 
turpitude or controlled substances weigh against granting discretionary relief from 
deportation. 
 47. MINN. R. CRIM. P.15.01 ¶ 10(d) (2006).  About half of the fifty states have 
similar rules requiring that defendants be warned about possible deportation 
consequences.  See Kesselbrenner, supra note 4, at Appendix K. 
14
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immigration outcome in mind. 
Nowhere was this clearer than the recent mass prosecution of 
illegal alien workers conducted in concert with the workplace raid 
on the Agriprocessors kosher meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa, 
in May 2008.  Much has been written from various sides in the 
debate(s) over illegal immigration about Postville and more 
generally about the soundness and civility of using of workplace 
raids as a deterrent to the hiring of illegal workers, and we do not 
intend to rehash those arguments.  The single issue that concerns 
us here is the publicly documented reality that the criminal 
prosecution of illegal alien employees at Agriprocessors was 
intentionally structured to achieve a supposedly noncriminal 
collateral consequence, i.e., deportation. 
First consider a brief summary of the Postville raid and 
criminal prosecution.  On May 12, 2008, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) executed a criminal search warrant at 
the Agriprocessors plant, as well as a civil search warrant for aliens 
illegally in the United States.48  The coordinated effort was the 
result of several months of collaboration between ICE and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).49  Within seventy-two hours of the 
initial arrests on immigration charges, U.S. Attorneys charged 306 
workers on a variety of charges including alleged aggravated 
identity theft, fraudulent use of Social Security numbers, 
fraudulently using a Permanent Resident card, and other alleged 
crimes.50  Despite the serious nature of the felony charges, barely a 
week later on May 20, 2008, eighty-five of the defendants had 
already pled guilty; of them, seventy-seven had been sentenced to 
five-month prison terms.51  The joint effort between ICE and DOJ 
was openly promoted by the agencies as designed to achieve a 
particular immigration outcome: that the alien defendants who 
pled guilty would be immediately deported after serving their five-
month prison terms52 or else face a trial on more serious charges, 
which if convicted would also result in certain deportation after a 
longer prison term.53  Aside from any concerns about the coercive 
 48. News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (May 12, 
2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/index.htm. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.
 51. News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2008, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080520waterloo.htm. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
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nature of the proceedings54 and the appropriateness of using 
identity theft statutes that are traditionally reserved for charging 
those operating fraud rings versus those who commit identity theft 
in order to work illegally,55 what is relevant for our brief 
examination is that the criminal justice system and the immigration 
enforcement system were working in lockstep to ensure that 
aggravated felony convictions were secured and that deportation 
was certain.  This included the court invoking the not commonly 
used judicial removal provision that allows a federal judge who has 
convicted a non-Permanent Resident of an aggravated felony to 
simultaneously enter an order of deportation without need for a 
separate later proceeding before an immigration judge.56
Again, without taking a position on whether it is appropriate to 
expend law enforcement resources57 on the kind of tactics and mass 
criminal court processing procedures employed in Postville to 
enforce the restriction against hiring of unauthorized workers,58 for 
 54. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) criticized the proceedings as 
involving “pressure cooker tactics” with scripted responses for the judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys prepared in advance.  See Press Release, Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Obtains Government ‘Manual’ for Prepackaged 
Guilty Pleas for Prosecution of Immigrant Workers in Postville, Iowa (July 31, 
2008), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/workplace/36219prs 20080731.html. 
 55. It has been argued that merely making up a nine-digit number out of thin 
air (which happens to coincide with a real person’s Social Security Number, 
though not intentionally so) and using it to work illegally does not constitute 
knowingly stealing that real person’s identity.  Following the Postville raid and 
mass prosecutions and several other similar high-profile raids employing similar 
tactics, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in an Eighth Circuit case to 
determine whether, to prove aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1028A(a)(1), the government must show that the defendant knew that the 
means of identification used belonged to another person.  See U.S. v. Flores-
Figueroa, 274 Fed. App’x. 501, No. 07-2871 (8th Cir. Apr. 23, 2008) (per curiam), 
cert. granted sub nom. Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., No. 08-108, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 7827 
(U.S. Oct. 20, 2008).  See also Associated Press, Justices Will Hear Identity-Theft Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, and Adam Liptak, Justices Take Case on Illegal Workers and 
Penalties for Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A14 (discussing potential 
impact on Postville-type raids of a Supreme Court ruling on this issue). 
 56. See INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (2006). 
 57. According to a recent article in the Des Moines Register, ICE reported 
that the cost of the Postville Raid was approximately $5.2 million.  This figure 
includes only the costs to the ICE agency specifically, and does not include any 
further costs to the other agencies involved (e.g., DOJ & DOL), who declined the 
Des Moines Register’s requests to provide cost figures for the Postville raid.  See 
William Petroski, Taxpayers’ Costs Top $5 Million for May Raid at Postville, DES 
MOINES REGISTER, Oct. 14, 2008. 
 58. The requirement to verify a new hire’s authorization to work in the 
United States specifically prohibits employers from trying to determine whether a 
16
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purposes of this article we merely note that the Postville operation 
shows that deportation is anything but a “collateral” consequence 
of criminal proceedings.  Instead of being a possible civil action 
taken after the criminal justice process has run its course, the 
present reality of criminal prosecution of aliens is that deportation 
may be a virtual certainty or even intended outcome of criminal 
prosecution.  It is thus beholden upon counsel,59 and indeed we 
would contend the courts and prosecuting bodies, to consider 
openly the likely immigration outcome of any criminal prosecution 
of an alien. 
V. WHAT IS A “CONVICTION”?  IT DEPENDS WHO YOU ASK . . .  
For fans of the television drama Law and Order,60 the criminal 
justice system appears neat and predictable.  Bad guy commits 
crime.  Good cop solves crime.  Good prosecutor fights against 
zealous defense attorney, and jury pronounces an often just 
decision.  If producer Dick Wolf wanted to present an alternative 
script filled with messy and unpredictable results, a Law and 
Disorder of sorts, the defendant would be an alien.  This is because 
in the world of immigration law a “conviction” is not limited to a 
formal plea of guilt or a verdict or finding of guilt by a judge or 
jury, as it is under state law.61  Instead it encompasses a wide variety 
new hire is a citizen or an alien, and requires the employer to focus only on 
whether the new hire presents any of a wide range of documents establishing 
identity and authorization to work.  Thus, the requirement to show authorization 
to work (the process of completing Form I-9 within three days of hire for any job 
in the United States) applies to U.S. citizens as much as to aliens.  See generally INA 
§§ 274A–274B, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)–1324(b). 
 59. The Ninth Circuit has overturned an alien’s federal court conviction for 
fraud based upon defense counsel’s affirmative and gravely incorrect advice that 
the alien defendant would not become deportable by pleading guilty.  See U.S. v. 
Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005).  In a 2004 decision, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court went further and imposed an affirmative obligation on criminal 
defense counsel to advise clients of the specific immigration consequences of 
pleading guilty.  See State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004) (“We hold 
that criminal defense attorneys are obligated to determine the immigration status 
of their clients.  If a client is a non-citizen, the attorney must advise that client of 
the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether 
deportation would be virtually certain. . . .  An attorney's failure to provide the 
required advice regarding immigration consequences will be ineffective assistance 
of counsel if the defendant suffers prejudice by the attorney's omission.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 60. See NBC, http://www.nbc.com/Law_&_Order/ (last visited Dec. 13, 
2008). 
 61. MINN. STAT. § 609.02 subdiv. 5 (2006) (defining “conviction” under 
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of dispositions that might surprise prosecutors and defense 
attorneys alike. 
To elucidate this difference between the meanings of 
“conviction” in criminal law versus immigration law, it is important 
to first understand the basic idea of what a conviction is as it applies 
to all persons in the United States, citizens and aliens alike.  
Minnesota Statute section 609.02 subdivision 5 defines a conviction 
as either “a plea of guilty; or . . . [a] verdict of guilty by a jury or a 
finding of guilty by the court.”62  This is the generally accepted 
definition understood by the public nationwide, as evidenced by a 
simple online search of the term in non-lawyer resources.  In 
laymen’s terms “conviction” refers to the final judgment rendered 
on the criminal after the plea of guilt.63  Final judgment includes 
ascertainment of guilt by either judge or jury.64  Where the 
defendant either admits to guilt in a plea, or does not contest the 
charge (also known as plea of nolo contendere), a judge accepts this 
plea as admission of guilt.65  The regurgitation of these elementary 
concepts in criminal law may seem unnecessary, but these basic 
rules as to what is a conviction for citizens do not hold for aliens. 
Let us now turn to the definition of “conviction” under 
immigration law.  The definition is much broader than what most 
states would define as a conviction: 
(A) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, 
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court 
or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where— 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the 
alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of 
guilt, and 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, 
penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be 
imposed. 
(B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a 
sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include 
the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a 
Minnesota criminal law). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 358 (8th ed. 2004). 
 64. See The Free Dictionary, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ 
Criminal +conviction (last visited Dec. 13, 2008). 
 65. See id. 
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court of law regardless of any suspension of the 
imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence 
in whole or in part. 66
This definition is designed to work around well-accepted state 
court procedures which allow a middle ground of “withholding 
adjudication of guilt” that does not let a defendant off scot-free but 
which provides one opportunity for a defendant (usually a first-
time offender) to avoid incurring a conviction under state law.  For 
example, for first-time drug offenders, the Minnesota Statutes allow 
criminal court proceedings to be deferred without an adjudication 
of guilt if the first-time offender pleads guilty and agrees to be 
placed on probation and participate in a drug or alcohol abuse 
awareness program.67  Successful completion of the probation 
period requires that the court dismiss the proceedings, and the 
successful defendant thereby does not incur a conviction.68  Indeed, 
the Minnesota Statutes go so far as to state that “[t]he discharge or 
dismissal shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of 
disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction 
of a crime or for any other purpose.”69
In the immigration realm, however, the immigration 
definition of conviction clearly would support finding a “conviction 
for immigration purposes” because this deferral procedure under 
Minnesota law requires that the defendant plead guilty to receive 
the deferral.70  When adding on the probation that is imposed as 
part of this deferral, it is a restraint on the alien defendant’s liberty 
that thereby satisfies the immigration definition of conviction.  
Thus, we are left with the curious result that the immigration laws 
rely on state law and state criminal procedures/proceedings to 
create the “conviction” needed to make an alien defendant 
deportable, but then promptly ignore the sovereignty of the states 
to determine the boundaries of what is and is not a conviction 
under that state’s laws.  The immigration laws are satisfied to allow 
the state to provide enough facts to find a “conviction” but then 
 66. See INA § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 67. See MINN. STAT. § 152.18 subdiv. 1 (2007). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. (for first-time offenders “after trial or upon a plea of guilty . . . the 
court may, without entering a judgment of guilty and with the consent of the 
person, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation upon 
such reasonable conditions as it may require and for a period, not to exceed 
the maximum sentence provided for the violation.”) (emphasis added). 
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quickly turn a blind eye to any additional reality that the state itself 
did not seek to impose a conviction and indeed allows for the 
charges to be dismissed entirely for some first-time offenders.71
In addition to this overly broad definition of conviction for 
immigration purposes, the alien defendant facing criminal charges 
also confronts the fact that for some immigration purposes, even 
merely “admitting” facts sufficient to constitute a criminal 
conviction is enough to be barred from the United States.72  This 
stems from the fact that in order to secure either temporary 
“nonimmigrant” entry to the United States, or especially to secure 
Permanent Resident status (for which two distinct FBI criminal 
background checks are performed), an alien must not be 
“inadmissible.”73  As noted previously, “inadmissibility” is a slightly 
different concept than “deportability” because an alien seeking to 
enter the United States has less procedural rights than an alien 
already admitted to the United States.74  This diminished 
procedural position applies as well to Permanent Residents who 
have committed a crime and then travelled outside the United 
States and have been apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection at the port of entry.75  Given that Permanent Residents 
who have committed crimes must prove “admissibility” the next 
time they travel outside the United States, proper strategizing 
around the immigration consequences of criminal convictions 
requires considering “admissibility” as well.76
The main concern in this regard is the ground of 
inadmissibility for crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and 
controlled substance offenses, which reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
In general . . . any alien convicted of, or who admits having 
committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the 
essential elements of— 
 71. In the next section we discuss the possibility of interceding in criminal 
proceedings even earlier in the process, at the stage of pretrial diversion. 
 72. See INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2006). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See supra note 25. 
 75. See INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (defining 
“admitted,” which places Permanent Residents who have committed crimes after 
being granted Permanent Resident status into the same procedural position of 
having to prove “admissibility” as if they had not already been admitted to 
Permanent Resident status in the past). 
 76. See INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). 
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(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a 
purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy 
to commit such a crime, or 
(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to 
violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United 
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled 
substance . . . is inadmissible.77
The italicized language goes even further beyond the 
definition of conviction under the average states’ law.78  It is worth 
considering several examples of “admitting” to crimes that will 
make an alien inadmissible even if state law would not consider the 
alien defendant to have anything close to a conviction. 
First, consider an admission of having committed a crime, 
even if the offender is not caught—this would be essentially the 
same as a “conviction” for purposes of inadmissibility under 
immigration law.79  One example of such an admission could be an 
alien who admits to an immigration officer during an interview for 
either Permanent Residence or for naturalization to U.S. 
citizenship that she has forged a check belonging to her ex-
husband to pay for daycare for her young children since her 
husband is a deadbeat who has skipped out on his child support 
payments.  Unfortunately, in Minnesota, forgery of a check 
(depending on the amount) may be punishable with imprisonment 
exceeding one year.80  Thus, even though no criminal proceeding 
may have occurred at all, the requirement as part of either the 
Permanent Residence process or naturalization process to admit to 
having committed any crimes for which no prosecution occurred 
may trigger a finding of inadmissibility or deportability.81
 77. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (emphasis 
added).  There are two exceptions to the CIMT ground of inadmissibility listed in 
the next subparagraph of this statute: the “minors exception” and the “petty 
offense exception,” the latter of which says this ground of inadmissibility does not 
apply if the maximum possible punishment for the crime does not exceed one 
year.  See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  Thus, a 
crime punishable as a “gross misdemeanor” under Minnesota law does not raise 
inadmissibility under the CIMT ground because the maximum possible 
punishment for a gross misdemeanor is up to exactly one year, but does not exceed 
one year.  MINN. STAT. § 609.02 subdivs. 2, 4 (2007). 
 78. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See MINN. STAT. § 609.631 (2007). 
 81. For many years, the Form I-485 most commonly used to apply for 
Permanent Residence through the INS/USCIS has asked applicants to disclose if 
they have ever inside or outside the United States “[k]nowingly committed any 
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Second, consider an admission of elements which when taken 
together constitute a crime—this too is equivalent to having 
incurred a conviction for purposes of inadmissibility.82  As we 
discuss in the next section, many pretrial diversion programs 
require an admission in writing to all elements of a crime—such as 
theft—in order to participate in such programs.83  To ensure 
compliance and to more efficiently conclude criminal court 
proceedings if later the defendant does not comply with pretrial 
conditions, prosecutors often require admissions of guilt with a 
degree of specificity sufficient to constitute a plea of guilty prior to 
agreeing to entry in a pretrial diversion program.84  Where 
admissions are made to each and every element of a crime, the 
alien defendant has the equivalent of a conviction for purposes of 
inadmissibility even if the charges are dismissed after successful 
completion of the pretrial diversion program.85
In summary, several types of admissions of guilt made to 
criminal and immigration agents are deemed “convictions” or 
“admissions” for immigration purposes and such convictions will 
support exclusion from the United States.86  This is contrasted with 
the regular understanding of “conviction” in the criminal justice 
system as limited to pleas of guilty, no contest (nolo contendere); a 
verdict of guilty by a jury or a finding of guilt by a judge, with any 
one of these actions followed by the judge actually adjudicating the 
crime of moral turpitude or a drug-related offense for which [they] have not been 
arrested.”  See USCIS, Application to Register Permanent Status or Adjust Status at 
3, May 27, 2008, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485.pdf.  A similar 
question appears on the Form N-400 application for naturalization to U.S. 
citizenship.  See UCSIS, Application for Naturalization at 8, Oct. 15, 2007, available 
at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/N-400.pdf.  The USCIS’s own publication 
provided to the public for explaining the naturalization process warns potential 
applicants for naturalization that, if they have criminal convictions, then applying 
for naturalization might result in being deported from the United States.  See 
USCIS, A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION at 25, 2008, available at http://www.uscis.gov/ 
files/article/M-476.pdf. 
 82. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 83. Pretrial diversions at the county level are authorized by Minnesota Statues 
section 401.065 (2006).  The statute itself does not require an admission to the 
essential elements of the crime that would otherwise be charged, but the 
requirement to admit or stipulate to those elements often is a requirement 
imposed by the programs themselves.  See infra Section VI. 
 84. See State v. J.Y.M., 711 N.W.2d 139, 140–41 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).  See also 
infra note 93.
 85. See INA § 212 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 86. See INA § 101(a)(48)(A)(i)–(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48)(A)(i)–(ii). 
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defendant’s guilt on the record.87  To escape a conviction merely 
for state law purposes is not sufficient to guard against immigration 
consequences.88
VI. PRETRIAL DIVERSION AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE 
Given how much broader the immigration definition of 
“conviction” is, when the nature of the charges and the early 
awareness of potential immigration impact permits, one vital 
avenue to explore for avoiding near-certain deportability or 
inadmissibility is pretrial diversion.89  Justice and mercy are two 
important but sometimes competing values when dealing with 
criminal punishment.  Mercy, as a value, plays a bigger role when 
dealing with first-time offenders whose crimes are deemed partly 
excusable and deserving of leniency.90  In the late 1960s, the final 
report of the President’s Commission of Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice recommended the use of diversion 
programs for benign offenders who did not deserve the full weight 
of their punishments.91  Minnesota law allows for pretrial diversion, 
which is defined as “the decision of a prosecutor to refer an 
offender to a diversion program on condition that the criminal 
charges against the offender will be dismissed after a specified 
period of time, or the case will not be charged, if the offender 
successfully completes the program.”92
A pretrial diversion program is often lauded as a progressive 
concept and allows first-time offenders to rehabilitate and 
reintegrate into society.93  In a pretrial diversion program, the 
defendant is usually required to attend classes, complete 
community service, or perform other related rehabilitative acts.  
When the defendant completes the assigned tasks satisfactorily, the 
 87. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 5(1)–(2) (2006). 
 88. See INA § 101(a)(48)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 89. See supra note 83. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See John P. Bellassi, A Short History of the Pretrial Diversion of Adult Defendants 
from Traditional Criminal Justice Processing Part One: The Early Years, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
PRETRIAL SERV., http://www.napsa.org/publications/diversionhistory.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2008).
 92. MINN. STAT. § 401.065 subdiv. 1(2) (2006). 
 93. See id. at subdiv. 2 (mandating that the program be “designed and 
operated to . . . reduce costs and caseload burdens . . . [and] minimize recidivism 
among diverted offenders”). 
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prosecutor dismisses the charges.94  For a U.S. citizen defendant, 
the benefits of having no conviction on his or her record as well as 
a chance to start over and make better choices are obvious.  For an 
alien defendant, however, completing a pretrial diversion program 
does not necessarily eliminate the threat of deportation. 
An alien’s participation in a pretrial diversion program will 
most likely avoid a conviction for immigration purposes if the 
prosecutor does not require an admission of guilt as a prerequisite 
for participation in diversion programs.95  As discussed above, an 
admission of guilt coupled with any restraint on liberty—such as 
having to complete a specified drug or alcohol awareness 
program96—is a conviction under immigration law.97  If a 
prosecutor requires an admission of guilt to enter a pretrial 
diversion program and this admission is recorded, then for 
immigration purposes the alien’s participation in pretrial diversion 
is deemed a conviction all the same.98  This is true even if, as a 
result of successful completion of the diversion program, the 
prosecutor drops the charges.99  While the purpose of pretrial 
programs is to permit first-time offenders to rehabilitate without 
any criminal record on their file, where admission of guilt is 
required to participate, the result has been that aliens who 
 94. See id. 
 95. See In re Grullon, 20 I. & N. Dec. 12, 14 (B.I.A. 1989).  In this case the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) applied a prior definition of “conviction,” 
which matched the two elements of the current definition in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(48)(A) (2000), for immigration purposes.  Id.  The 
BIA held that where the record clearly indicated the alien did not plead guilty in 
order to enter a Florida pretrial diversion program, which the alien subsequently 
completed, the alien did not have a conviction for immigration purposes.  Id. at 
15.  The definition of conviction was subsequently amended by the enactment of 
INA § 101(a)(48)(A) to eliminate the third element described in the case.  INA, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322(a)(1) (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006)).  Still, Grullon remains good law on the first element of 
the definition of conviction, holding that diversion into a pretrial program without 
a plea of guilty means the first element of the definition of conviction for 
immigration purposes is not satisfied. 
 96. “[R]estraint of liberty was found to include incarceration, probation, fine 
or restitution, and community-based sanctions such as rehabilitation programs, 
work-release or study release programs, revocation or suspension of a driver’s 
license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or community services.”  
Grullon, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 14,  n.3.  See also supra note 70. 
 97. It is also a conviction for the issue of “inadmissibility,” as even without any 
restraint on liberty just the admission alone may be enough to trigger 
inadmissibility.  See INA § 212 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
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participate in these programs have a conviction for immigration 
purposes and may be deportable depending on the type of crime 
committed.100
As noted above, Minnesota law authorizes pretrial diversion 
programs at the county level.101  Of seven existing programs as of 
November 1999, five required an admission of guilt.102  Hennepin, 
Ramsey, Anoka, Washington, and Dakota counties, which arguably 
contain a large number of alien defendants,103 require admissions 
of guilt, 104 as does the Stearns County program.105  Where an alien 
defendant is being entered into a pretrial diversion program in an 
attempt to stave off deportation, it would be best if such admissions 
of guilt be limited to only a general statement acknowledging or 
not contesting involvement (and indeed some states do permit 
entering pretrial diversion without an admission of guilt).106  This is 
an important point since an admission that does not rise to a full 
admission of guilt or of committing acts sufficient to constitute the 
elements of a crime may evade immigration consequences.107  Such 
a general, non-specific admission, however, might not satisfy the 
requirements of the prosecution for participation in the pretrial 
program.108  If each element of the crime has to be admitted, then 
 100. See INA § 212 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 101. See MINN. STAT. § 401.065, subdiv. 2 (2006). 
 102. See JESSICA SIMON & SARAH WELTER, REVIEW OF ADULT PRETRIAL DIVERSION 
IN HENNEPIN COUNTY, COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE (1999), 
http://www.crimeand justice.org/researchReports, (last visited Oct.18, 2008) 
[hereinafter SIMON & WELTER]. 
 103. See IMMIGRATION TRENDS IN MINNESOTA: POWER POINT PRESENTATION ON 
IMMIGRATION (2003), http://www.demography.state.mn.us/immigration.htm. 
 104. The likely purpose of requiring admissions of guilt is so that a conviction 
can be entered in the record if the terms of the diversion program are not met.  
See SIMON & WELTER, supra note 102, at 23. 
 105. See JANELLE P. KENDALL, ADULT DIVERSION PROGRAM DESCRIPTION, 
http://www.co.stearns.mn.us/documents/ AdultDivProgram.pdf (last visited Oct. 
18, 2008). 
 106. See, e.g., ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION 
PROJECT, INC. (2007), http://www.sfpretrial.com/eligibilitycriteria.html (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2008) (“Acceptance of diversion and compliance with conditions 
imposed shall not be deemed to constitute an admission of guilt.”).  In Florida’s 
Seventeenth Judicial District, a defendant seeking pretrial diversion must “provide 
facts indicative of knowledge or conduct on the part of the Applicant consistent 
with guilt” without explicitly admitting guilt.  See MISDEMEANOR DIVERSION 
PROGRAM, BROWARD SENIOR INTERVENTION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM, TRUANCY 
DIVERSION PROGRAM AND D.W.L.S. DIVERSION PROGRAM, http://www.sao17.state.fl. 
us/pretrial.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2008). 
 107. See supra notes 68, 74, 77–78, 94 and accompanying text. 
 108. See, e.g., Stearns County Adult Diversion Program Description supra note 
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an alien might not be able to escape immigration consequences 
such as removal from the United States. 
VII. THE LIMITED POSSIBILITY OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
We feel we can speak for all immigration attorneys when we say 
that we always prefer that for all aliens facing criminal charges that 
the issue of deportability always be fully explored and strategized at 
the start of the criminal court process.  The reality, though, is that 
for many aliens the realization that they have pled guilty to a crime 
that makes them deportable with no hope of relief only comes after 
the court’s acceptance of the plea and entry of judgment have 
become final.  In this all too common situation, many aliens turn to 
post-conviction relief, seeking to vacate the plea of guilty so as to 
subvert deportation. 
There are substantive and equitable reasons for a court to 
expunge or set aside a conviction so that a former defendant has 
no criminal record.  Where such relief is granted, the conviction 
ceases to exist for most practical purposes, thus giving former 
offenders a second chance to “straighten up and fly right” and not 
be barred from many jobs due to the taint of a criminal record.  
Under Minnesota law, expungement or “setting aside” of a 
conviction refers to a former offender petitioning the criminal 
court to seal the records and disallow disclosure of certain criminal 
convictions.109  Setting aside a conviction is accomplished through a 
pardon extraordinary, granted by the Board of Pardons and 
effectively results in “setting aside and nullifying the conviction and 
of purging the person of [the conviction], and the person shall 
never after that be required to disclose the conviction at any time 
or place other than in a judicial proceeding or as part of the 
licensing process for peace officers.”110  The restoration of civil 
rights refers to one’s ability to vote and hold office.111  Minnesota 
state courts have identified means to rehabilitate the criminal 
record of the individual when it is shown that he or she has 
effectively shown to possess good moral character and has 
105, at 4 (“To be eligible for the diversion program, the offender must . . . [a]dmit 
guilt, acknowledge responsibility, and provide a FACTUAL BASIS REGARDING 
THE OFFENSE.”) (emphasis in original). 
 109. See MINN. STAT. § 609A.01–02 (2006). 
 110. See MINN. STAT. § 638.02 (2006). 
 111. See MINN. STAT. § 609.165 subdiv. 1 (2006). 
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integrated into society in a positive manner.112
In addition, Minnesota courts also dismiss cases where a 
defendant has pled guilty and the plea has been accepted, but 
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment has been stayed and 
the defendant placed on probation with perhaps payment of a fine 
or restitution depending on the crime.113  If the defendant 
complies with the probation requirements, then the case is later 
dismissed, and the former defendant is restored to the position that 
existed prior to the commission of the crime (i.e., has no 
conviction under Minnesota law).114
Thus, there are several means through which a convicted 
criminal can ultimately turn back the clock and remove convictions 
from his or her record.  The vast majority of these rehabilitative 
procedures, however, have no effect for immigration purposes.115  
This is because for immigration purposes, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that the vacating of a criminal 
conviction for reasons solely related to rehabilitation or 
immigration hardships does not eliminate the conviction for 
immigration purposes.116  Only if the conviction was vacated on the 
merits on the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the 
underlying criminal proceedings would the action of the criminal 
court to vacate the conviction be respected as having eliminated 
the conviction for immigration purposes (and therefore in most 
cases having eliminated the deportability).117  Indeed, even if a 
 112. See, e.g., State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. 2006) (“In addition 
to statutory expungement under chapter 609A, Minnesota courts also have the 
inherent power to expunge criminal records . . .  ‘[by deciding] whether 
expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the 
disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on 
the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring an expungement order.’”) 
(quoting State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. 1981).
 113. See MINN. STAT. § 609.135 (2006 & Supp. 2007). 
 114. See, id. at subdiv. 2(f) (“The defendant shall be discharged six months 
after the term of the stay expires, unless the stay has been revoked or extended 
under paragraph (g), or the defendant has already been discharged.”). 
 115. One exception is a full, unconditional executive pardon, which is the one 
rehabilitative action that does not vacate the conviction on its merits but 
nonetheless serves to relieve the alien from deportability for an aggravated felony 
conviction.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2006 & Supp. 
2008).  If the nature of the elements of the crime separately also would trigger 
inadmissibility in the event of future travel outside the United States, that 
inadmissibility would not be cured by the pardon, which does not vacate the 
conviction on its merits. 
 116. In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (2003). 
 117. Id.  See also In re Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378 (2000) (according 
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criminal court ostensibly states that it has vacated a conviction on 
the merits due to a substantive or procedural defect, if the record 
of the proceedings reflects an ulterior motive to avoid immigration 
consequences, the action of the criminal court might still not be 
given the full faith and credit it should be given. 
On the other hand, if state law requires a defendant to be 
advised that there may be immigration consequences to pleading 
guilty118 and the defendant is not in fact so advised by the court, 
then that is a substantive defect in the conviction.  If that 
conviction is then vacated on the merits, it is due to an error under 
state law and not solely for immigration reasons, and thus the order 
vacating the conviction will eliminate the conviction for 
immigration purposes.119  Thus, for aliens who have pled guilty to a 
crime that is now realized to cause deportability, it is vital to obtain 
a complete copy of the criminal court records and transcripts of 
hearings to determine if any such required advisal was given.  Even 
if a required advisal about immigration consequences was given in 
a particular case, competent criminal appellate counsel should be 
consulted to determine if there were any other substantive defects 
(e.g., constitutional defects) in the record of conviction that would 
warrant seeking post-conviction relief to vacate the conviction on its 
merits for a reason independent of immigration consequences. 
VIII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As much as we might like to see deportation be considered a 
direct consequence of pleading guilty and thus actively analyzed 
and considered from the very start for all alien criminal 
defendants, we acknowledge that to do so would require additional 
resources that are presently unavailable to the criminal justice 
system.  To say the least, it requires a complex analysis to determine 
exactly what final disposition of a criminal charge will or will not 
affect an alien defendant’s deportability (or future 
“inadmissibility”) and in some cases requires taking the alien 
full faith and credit to a New York court’s vacation of a conviction under a statute 
that was neither an expungement nor a rehabilitative statute). 
 118. See supra note 47. 
 119. See In re Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878 (2006) (holding that, where an 
alien defendant was allowed to plead guilty in Ohio without prior instruction by 
the court of possible immigration consequences in violation of Ohio Revised Code 
§ 2943.031, a state court action vacating the conviction as provided for in the same 
statute eliminated the conviction for immigration purposes because the state court 
action was based on an underlying defect in the proceedings under state law). 
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defendant’s country of origin into account.  We are forced to admit 
that is probably not realistic to expect federal and state district 
court judges, prosecutors, and criminal defense attorneys to 
become experts in immigration law.  But at the same time we 
cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that the immigration deck is 
often heavily stacked against the criminal alien defendant, 
especially one who might receive rather lenient treatment as a first-
time offender under state law. 
In the end, most alien defendants must take the initiative to 
either seek assistance from legal services organizations or from 
private counsel who are sufficiently knowledgeable of immigration, 
so that the possibility of deportation can be taken into 
consideration as an integral part of plea negotiations or deciding 
whether or not to proceed to trial.  It is our hope that this article 
helps to raise the awareness of all members of the bench and the 
bar to this critical need in light of how closely entwined our 
criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems have 
become. 
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